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I. INTRODUCTION 
Mediators face daunting challenges, even in the simplest of 
cases.  Parties and their counsel ask mediators to transform conflict 
into concurrence and disputes and hostility into agreements and 
harmony.  To succeed, a mediator must quickly master the material 
facts, develop  rapport and trust with the parties and counsel, 
present and articulate both sides of disputed issues, and ascertain 
mutually agreeable solutions to all disputed issues.  Once the 
mediator completes those tasks and helps the parties negotiate an 
       †  Partner at Coleman Hull & van Vliet, PLLP, served as Chair of the 
Minnesota State Bar Association’s Construction Section, served on the Governing 
Committee of the American Bar Association Forum on the Construction Industry, 
and provides dispute resolution services, with extensive experience as an arbitrator 
and mediator of construction and commercial disputes.         
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agreement, he must then be able to document that agreement in a 
written, coherent, and enforceable agreement. 
Mediation and the mediator’s role are inherently difficult.  
The difficulty, however, increases exponentially in cases with 
multiple parties, extensive lists of disputed factual issues, complex 
legal and contractual disputes, large damages claims, insurance 
disputes, and heightened emotions.  The typical construction case 
presents most of these factors and accounts for why construction 
cases can be difficult, challenging, time consuming, and frustrating 
for all parties involved in the process. 
However, the existence of these factors also explains why 
almost all construction cases are mediated.1  Simply stated, the 
same complexities of construction cases that make mediation 
challenging are the same complexities that make construction cases 
so difficult to try or arbitrate and predict the ultimate outcome.2
Despite their difficulty, construction cases are most frequently 
mediated to successful conclusion.3  Factors that enhance the 
probability of success are usually within the control of the 
mediator.4  Therefore, when faced with large and complex 
construction cases, the mediator should consider not only basic 
mediation tactics, but also alternative approaches. 
One tool a mediator should consider to facilitate the 
mediation process is the use of the blind settlement process.  In 
blind negotiations, the mediator negotiates with confidential 
numbers from all the parties and discloses only the gap between 
the claimants’ demand and the defending parties’ collective offers.  
Individual contributions or the final settlement amount remain 
confidential throughout the mediation process. 
This article will explore the factors that make construction 
cases and mediation of construction cases difficult.5  After 
identifying the hurdles to successful construction mediation, the 
article will then focus on the benefits of the use of a blind 
 1. Richard P. Flake & Susan G. Perin, Mediating Construction Disputes: What 
Works and What Doesn’t, DISP. RESOL. J., May-July 2003, at 24–26. 
 2. Id. at 34.  Flake and Perin note that construction cases are “notoriously 
complex.”  Id. at 26. 
 3. John P. Madden, Recipe for Success in Construction Mediation, DISP. RESOL. J., 
May-July 2001, at 16, 18.  Madden indicates that more than eighty-five percent of 
construction disputes settle successfully.  Id.   
 4. Id. at 21.  Two out of the four factors for success that Madden notes are 
squarely within the control of the mediator: knowledge of the facts in dispute and 
expertise in the subject matter.  Id. 
 5. Infra Part A. 
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settlement process.6  The discussion and analysis regarding the use 
of a blind settlement process will focus on the context of 
construction disputes. 
II. THE COMPLEXITY OF CONSTRUCTION CASES 
Construction projects produce an abundance of litigation.  
The construction project begins as an intangible idea or desire in 
the mind of the owner.  The owner conveys his intangible idea and 
desire for the project to an architect, an engineer, or a design-
builder.  The design professional then works with the owner to 
quantify and define the owner’s thoughts and to develop tangibly a 
final design for construction.  The process continues as the project 
goes from paper to actual construction.  Throughout the process, 
the project evolves and changes up to the date of completion. 
The disparate interests of all the parties participating in a 
construction project increase the potential for disputes or claims.  
The owner wants the project done quickly, to the highest level of 
quality, and at the lowest cost.7  The design professional works to 
prepare a design that meets the owner’s desires and budget 
constraints.  Further, the design professional seeks to convey all 
required information, coordinate all disciplines, maintain a budget, 
and still allow the contractor to exercise control over the means 
and methods of construction.  Finally, the contractor desires to 
complete the project as specified and to maximize profit on the 
project.  To this end, the contractor is interested in minimizing 
costs and does so by completing only the work specified without 
any extras.  However, this often causes the contractor’s vision of the 
project to vary significantly from the vision of the owner or the 
design professional.8
The large number of participants is another key factor that 
increases the potential for claims on construction projects.9  On any 
 6. Infra Part E. 
 7. E.g., Susan Conbere & Asa Foss, More, Better, Faster, Cheaper: Technology 
Solutions for Advancing the Homebuilding Process, CAL. BUILDER, 
http://www.cabuilder.com/internal.asp?pid=107 (discussing recent trends in the 
construction industry’s strategies for efficiency and cost-effectiveness) (last visited 
Nov. 15, 2007). 
 8. See generally Thomas J. Stipanowich, Reconstructing Construction Law: Reality 
and Reform in a Transactional System, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 463 (discussing the divergent 
interests of the various parties to a construction contract). 
 9. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration and the Multiparty Dispute: The Search for 
Workable Solutions, 72 IOWA L. REV. 473, 478 (1987) (stating that parties to a prime 
3
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given project, the owner may contract with several different entities 
in order to create a project.10  The owner may contract with an 
owner’s representative, a construction manager, an architect, an 
engineer, and a general contractor.11  Each of these parties may in 
turn retain sub-consultants or subcontractors to complete the 
project.12  The general contractor in almost all circumstances will 
enter into several subcontracts and supply agreements to complete 
the project.13  In short, the higher the number of participants in a 
project, the greater the likelihood of claims and complexity of legal 
issues and disputes that arise from the project.14
As the potential claims increase, the mediation of construction 
disputes becomes more complicated.  Many construction disputes 
arise from or relate to the claimed existence of design or 
construction defects on a project.15  The list of design or 
construction defects can range from fairly small (one to three) to 
enormous (hundreds to thousands).16  The disputes are further 
complicated if they involve scheduling, delay, or acceleration 
claims.  In those cases, virtually every aspect of the construction 
project becomes material and critical in determining cause and 
responsibility.  If managed improperly, those types of legal issues 
can cause a single lawsuit to morph into countless individual “mini 
lawsuits.”17
Further complicating the mediation of construction disputes 
are the issues of risk shifting, risk avoidance, or collections.  In 
many construction cases, the existence and enforceability of 
insurance coverage, surety protection, indemnity agreements, or 
other risk management devices can significantly complicate 
resolution of construction disputes.18  General liability insurers 
contract for construction seldom go into battle in isolation). 
 10. Id. at 478–79. 
 11. Id.  See also cases cited id. at 478 n.40. 
 12. Id.  See also cases cited id. at 479 n.42. 
 13. Id. at 479. 
 14. Id. at 479–80.  See also 2 THOMAS H. OEHMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 
51:1 (3d ed. 2006). 
 15. See Richard H. Glucksman & Glenn T. Barger, Managing Construction Defect 
Cases, CONSTRUCTION LAW., July 1996, at 7, 7–8 (discussing the typical legal 
progression when an owner files suit based on an alleged defect). 
 16. Cf. Debra Porgrund Stark & Andrew Cook, Pay it Forward: A Proactive 
Model to Resolving Construction Defects and Market Failure, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 6–8 
(2003) (discussing the nature and extent of common construction defects). 
 17. See Stipanowich, supra note 9, at 479 nn.44–45 (citing numerous cases 
involving multiple derivative lawsuits). 
 18. Cf. Robert L. Meyers, III & Debra A. Perelman, Risk Allocation Through 
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frequently raise coverage issues that dramatically affect the ability 
of case resolution.19  Surety companies that may be involved in a 
mediation or construction loss will not only work hard to avoid 
unnecessary payments, but will also preserve and pursue indemnity 
or recovery of any payments made from their principals or 
indemnitors.20  Further, indemnity agreements contained in 
subcontracts can dramatically change a party’s liability exposure 
and insurance coverage.21  Anti-indemnification statutes and each 
state’s interpretation of indemnity clauses also come into play.22  
Finally, given the volatile nature of the construction industry, 
collection of claims is often a fundamental concern either because 
the contractor is insolvent or out of business, or because of 
insurance coverage questions.23
Finally, a mediator and the parties must understand that on 
any given construction lawsuit, multiple mediations occur at any 
given time.  Although an owner may have a single claim against the 
general contractor or the design professional, the general 
contractor and design professional are negotiating not only with 
the owner but also with subcontractors, sub-consultants, insurers or 
sureties, and one another.  Each entity may also pursue affirmative 
claims against the project owner and each other. 
Indemnity Obligations in Construction Contracts, 40 S.C. L. REV. 989 (1989) (discussing 
the legal complexities of indemnification in construction contracts). 
 19. CHRIS E. RYMAN, SETTLEMENT STRATEGIES: HOW AND WHEN TO SETTLE TO 
SAVE THE MOST MONEY FOR YOUR CLIENT 5–6 (presented to the DRI Construction 
Law Seminar, Sept. 9–10, 2004, Scottsdale, AZ), available at 
http://www.coatsrose.com/upload/Broadcast86.pdf. 
 20. See John W. Hinchey, Surety’s Performance Over Protest of Principal: 
Considerations and Risks, 22 TORT & INS. L.J. 133, 137–38 (1986). 
 21. See, e.g., Holmes v. Watson-Forsberg Co., 488 N.W.2d 473, 474–75 (Minn. 
1992) (holding that a provision of a standard subcontract agreement, which 
required subcontractor to purchase liability insurance for all damages and injury 
to all persons and property resulting from or in any manner connected with 
execution of work provided for in subcontract, was enforceable promise to provide 
specific insurance coverage for benefit of others, rather than an unenforceable 
indemnification agreement). 
 22. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 337.01–.05 (2006) (reflecting Minnesota’s anti-
indemnification statutes, which, despite being labeled “anti-indemnification” 
statutes, set out the process that must be followed to generate enforceable broad 
form indemnity agreements); Holmes, 488 N.W.2d at 474–75. 
 23. See Lawrence Ponoroff, Construction Claims in Bankruptcy: Making the Best of 
a Bad Situation, 11 BANKR. DEV. J. 343 (1995) (describing the difficulties that 
construction litigants face in trying to recover money from insolvent parties). 
5
Heley: Mediation of Construction Cases Using "Blind Negotiations": Can P
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2007
8. HELEY - ADC.DOC 12/15/2007  3:19:23 PM 
278 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1 
 
After subcontractors or sub-consultants are added to the mix, 
they in turn negotiate with the owner, the general contractor, the 
architect, suppliers, insurers or sureties, and each other. 
Given these complexities, the mediator must evaluate and 
consider every aspect of the mediation process, including the 
structure of negotiations, to maximize chances of successfully 
resolving construction disputes.  In this regard, one option for the 
mediator to consider is the use of blind settlement negotiations. 
III.  MEDIATION CONFIDENTIALITY 
A. In General 
Confidentiality is a basic principal of the mediation process.24  
A confidential mediation process encourages participants to speak 
openly regarding their interests, concerns, and desires without fear 
that their disclosures will be used against them in court if the case 
does not resolve.25  Most mediators confirm the existence and 
importance of the confidential nature of mediation early in the 
process.26  Many courts have expressed the belief that mediation 
confidentiality encourages settlements.27  Parties are more likely to 
be open and honest with each other as well as the mediator.  
Accordingly, the likelihood of settlement increases because the 
parties know that the communications exchanged in mediation, 
and the ultimate agreement reached through mediation, would be 
excluded from evidence in any later proceedings.28
The Uniform Mediation Act (UMA) drafted by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws29 reflects the 
 24. Diane K. Vescovo et al., Essay—Ethical Dilemmas in Mediation, 31 U. MEM. L. 
REV. 59, 80 (2000). 
 25. CHARLES B. CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION & SETTLEMENT § 
16.08(8)(a) (5th ed. 2005). 
 26. See id. 
 27. Sarah Williams, Confidentiality in Mediation: Is it Encouraging Good Mediation 
or Bad Conduct?, 2005 J. DISP. RESOL. 209, 215 (2005). 
 28. See In re Lake Utopia Paper, Ltd. v. Connelly Containers, Inc., 608 F.2d 
928, 930 (2d Cir. 1979) (remarking that a lack of confidentiality would constrain 
parties to conduct themselves in a “cautious, tight-lipped, non-committal manner 
more suitable to poker players in a high-stakes game than to adversaries 
attempting to arrive at a just resolution of a civil dispute”).  See also David A. Ruiz, 
Asserting a Comprehensive Approach for Defining Mediation Communication, 15 OHIO ST. 
J. ON DISP. RESOL. 851, 856 (2000); SARAH R. COLE ET AL., MEDIATION:  LAW, POLICY, 
PRACTICE § 9 (2d ed. 1994 & Supp. 1997). 
 29. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
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importance and broad expectation of confidentiality in mediation 
proceedings.30  The UMA addresses confidentiality in several 
respects.  First, the UMA creates a privilege for mediation 
communications unless it is waived or precluded in other sections 
of the Act.31  The UMA buttresses this position with a 
confidentiality section.32  Section 8 of the UMA provides, “[u]nless 
subject to the [insert statutory references to open meetings act and 
open records act], mediation communications are confidential to 
the extent agreed by the parties or provided by other law or rule of 
this State.”33  The UMA provision restates commonly accepted 
practices regarding the confidentiality of mediation 
communications outside of the mediation process.  Essentially, 
confidentiality becomes a matter of contract unless otherwise 
provided for in part by law or statute.34
Different jurisdictions vary significantly with regard to the 
extent to which confidentiality of mediation communications or 
mediation results is protected.35  Most jurisdictions protect 
communications made in mediation from discovery at least to some 
extent.36  These laws addressing confidentiality of mediation 
communications have been categorized into three separate areas: 
1) blanket confidentiality, whereby no disclosure of any 
mediation communications may be made (absolute 
confidentiality); 2) nearly absolute confidentiality, subject 
to enumerated exceptions, which vary by state statute, or 
disclosure only upon consent by all parties, including the 
mediator (enumerated confidentiality); or 3) qualified 
confidentiality, providing mediation confidentiality but 
expressly recognizing judicial discretion to order 
disclosure in individual cases where needed to prevent a 
manifest injustice or to enforce court orders.37
(NCCUSL) is a non-partisan organization that drafts model legislation to bring 
clarity, stability, and uniformity to state laws.  See http://www.nccusl.org.  See also 
UNIF. MEDIATION ACT FINAL DRAFT (2001), available at http://www.mediate.com/ 
articles/umafinalstyled.cfm. 
 30. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT (2003), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/ 
bll/archives/ulc/mediat/2003finaldraft.htm. 
 31. Id. § 4(a). 
 32. Id. § 8. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. § 8 cmt. b. 
 35. Williams, supra note 27, at 216. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. (quoting Maureen A. Westin, Confidentiality’s Constitutionality: The 
Incursion on Judicial Powers to Regulate Party Conduct in Court-Connected Mediation, 8 
7
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Laws passed in Ohio and California provide a good example of 
the first category, “Absolute Confidentiality.”38  The Ohio statute 
“renders all mediation communications confidential whether the 
mediation is court-annexed or arranged by the parties 
themselves.”39  The California statute also provides for absolute 
confidentiality of mediation communications.40
Second, the UMA creates a category of protection called 
“Nearly Absolute Confidentiality,” which several states have 
adopted.41  Although the UMA allows some flexibility, it also 
provides strong protection for mediation communications.42  This 
UMA protection safeguards confidentiality by creating a privilege 
to avoid the compelled disclosure of communications in 
subsequent litigation.43  It prevents mediators from making 
disclosures to judges or from reporting on the status of any 
mediation.44  The UMA exceptions to confidentiality are generally 
limited to threats of bodily injury, plans to commit a crime, 
evidence of abuse or neglect, evidence of professional misconduct 
or malpractice by the mediator, or misconduct or malpractice 
involving a party, non-party participant or party representative.45
The third and the final category of protection that the UMA 
creates allows for mediation confidentiality but recognizes judicial 
discretion to order disclosure.46  In Wisconsin, for example, 
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 29, 49 (2003)). 
 38. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1127 (2007) (explaining that California law makes a 
mediator’s testimony or writing inadmissible, making it confidential); OHIO REV. 
CODE § 2710.07 (2007) (establishing that Ohio law provides that “mediation 
communications are confidential to the extent agreed by the parties or provided 
by other sections of the Revised Code or rules adopted under any section of the 
Revised Code.”). 
 39. Williams, supra note 27, at 216 (quoting COLE, supra note 28). 
 40. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1119 (Supp. 2007).  “No evidence of anything said 
or any admission made for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a 
mediation or a mediation consultation is admissible or subject to discovery . . . .”  
Id. § 1119(a). 
 41. See MassUMA Working Group, Modifications of the Uniform Mediation 
Act by States That Have Formally Adopted the UMA as of July 2007, 
http://www.massuma.net/umachart.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2007).  As of July 
2007, nine states had adopted some or all of the UMA.  Id.  These states are the 
District of Columbia, Illinois, Iowa, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, Utah, Vermont, 
and Washington.  Id. 
 42. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 4 (2003), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/ 
bll/archives/ulc/mediat/2003finaldraft.htm. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. § 5. 
 45. See, e.g., id. § 4. 
 46. See id. § 6(b)(1). 
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protects mediation communications in general, but expressly allows 
and recognizes judicial discretion to make exceptions to the 
general rule.47  Although support for mediation confidentiality is 
well established, some individuals advocate the importance of 
disclosure of mediation communications or mediation results 
under certain circumstances.48
Despite the UMA, Minnesota passed its own Civil Mediation 
Act.49  This statute, however, is silent as to the issue of 
confidentiality.50  The Minnesota General Rules of Practice for the 
District Courts, however, specifically addresses the confidentiality 
issue in the context of mediation.51  Rule 114.08 states that no 
evidence of any “ADR proceeding or any fact concerning the 
proceeding may be admitted in a trial . . . or in any subsequent 
proceeding involving any of the issues or parties to the 
proceeding.”52  Rule 114.08 notes that “no statements made nor 
 47. WIS. STAT. § 904.085(4)(e) (2000) (stating that disclosure is allowed “if 
necessary to prevent a manifest injustice of sufficient magnitude to outweigh the 
importance of protecting the principle of confidentiality in mediation 
proceedings generally.”). 
 48. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Public Access to Private Settlements, in WHAT’S FAIR-
ETHICS FOR NEGOTIATORS 507–18 (Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Michael Wheeler eds., 
2004). 
 49. Minnesota Civil Mediation Act, MINN. STAT. §§ 572.31–.40 (2006). 
 50. See id. 
 51. MINN. R. GEN. PRAC. 114.08 (2007). 
 52. Id. at 114.08(a).  The full text of the rule reads as follows: 
(a) Evidence.  Without the consent of all parties and an order of 
the court, or except as provided in Rule 114.09(e)(4), no 
evidence that there has been an ADR proceeding or any fact 
concerning the proceeding may be admitted in a trial de novo 
or in any subsequent proceeding involving any of the issues or 
parties to the proceeding. 
(b) Inadmissibility.  Subject to Minn. Stat. § 595.02 and except as 
provided in paragraphs (a) and (d), no statements made nor 
documents produced in non-binding ADR processes which are 
not otherwise discoverable shall be subject to discovery or other 
disclosure.  Such evidence is inadmissible for any purpose at the 
trial, including impeachment. 
(c) Adjudicative Evidence.  Evidence in consensual special master 
proceedings, binding arbitration, or in non-binding arbitration 
after the period for a demand for trial expires, may be used in 
subsequent proceedings for any purpose for which it is 
admissible under the rules of evidence. 
(d) Sworn Testimony.  Sworn testimony in a summary jury trial may 
be used in subsequent proceedings for any purpose for which it 
is admissible under the rules of evidence. 
(e) Records of Neutral.  Notes, records, and recollections of the 
neutral are confidential, which means that they shall not be 
9
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documents produced in non-binding ADR processes which are not 
otherwise discoverable shall be subject to discovery or other 
disclosure.”53  Further, Rule 114.08 confirms that “[s]uch evidence 
is inadmissible for any purpose at the trial, including 
impeachment.”54
The appendix to Rule 114 reaffirms the concept of 
confidentiality.  Rule IV, “Confidentiality,” states that “[t]he neutral 
shall maintain confidentiality to the extent provided by Rule 114.08 
and 114.10 and any additional agreements made with or between 
the parties.”55  Advisory comments on Rule 114 confirm that “[a] 
neutral should discuss issues of confidentiality with the parties 
before beginning an ADR process[,] including any limitations on 
the scope [or extent] of confidentiality . . . .”56  Minnesota has not 
yet adopted the UMA, but the UMA is slated for consideration 
during the 2007–08 legislative sessions.57
B. Private Caucuses 
The current law in Minnesota and the rest of the United States 
reflects a strong preference that any negotiations occurring during 
mediation, or settlements resulting from mediation, are treated as 
confidential.  A related question, however, is how the mediator 
should address information provided through separate caucus 
sessions during the mediation.  In other words, does the mediator 
have the right or ability to share information provided by one party 
disclosed to the parties, the public, or anyone other than the 
neutral, unless (1) all parties and the neutral agree to such 
disclosure or (2) required by law or other applicable 
professional codes.  No record shall be made without the 
agreement of both parties, except for a memorandum of issues 
that are resolved. 
 53. Id. at 114.08(b). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 114 app. R. IV. 
 56. Id. 
 57. MINNESOTA UNIFORM LAWS COMMISSION: AGENCY PROFILE (2006), 
http://www.budget.state.mn.us/budget/operating/200809/nov/331188.pdf.  In 
its report regarding the 2008–2009 biennial budget, the Uniform Laws 
Commission addresses “Key Measures.”  The Agency Profile states, “[d]uring the 
2007–08 Minnesota legislative session, the Minnesota commissioners will likely 
bring to the legislature for consideration the following acts: Uniform Arbitration 
Act, Uniform Mediation Act, Uniform Correction of Defamation Act, Uniform 
Environmental Covenants Act, Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, Uniform 
Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act, Uniform 
Real Property Recording Act, and Uniform Revised Anatomical Gift Act.” Id. 
10
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in a private caucus with another party in a later caucus?  The 
Minnesota General Rules of Practice for the District Courts provide 
that the mediator shall “maintain confidentiality” to the extent 
provided by the Rules and by “any additional agreements made 
with or between the parties.”58  Because the Minnesota rules and 
Minnesota statutes are silent as to the confidentiality or disclosure 
of material exchanged during the caucus sessions, the mediator 
early in the process must address this issue. 
Mediators differ as to their approach of information 
exchanged during private caucuses.  Some mediators treat the 
information as entirely confidential and agree to disclose 
information only upon explicit authorization.59  Others take the 
position that all information provided in the caucus is public unless 
specifically designated as confidential.60  A hybrid approach is to 
characterize all “factual” information disclosed during private 
caucuses as public information, but then characterize as 
confidential all other information regarding tactics, strategy, 
negotiation goals, or other related “non-factual” material.61  
Regardless of the approach taken, the mediator must make clear 
how he will treat information provided during the private caucuses.  
Failure to do so may result in improper or unintended disclosure of 
confidential information.62
C.  Negotiating in the Blind 
The vast majority of published material regarding mediation 
confidentiality addresses the issue of confidentiality only with 
regard to disclosure and admissibility of information outside the 
mediation process or with regard to the private caucus.63  In multi-
party cases, however, the concept of confidentiality can be carried 
one step further and used to shield or limit information regarding 
the parties’ negotiated positions.  This circumstance is referred to 
as the “blind” or “double blind” approach to negotiations.64
 58. MINN. R. GEN. PRAC. 114.08 app. R. IV. 
 59. Vescovo et al., supra note 24, at 81. 
 60. Id. 
 61. The author’s practice is to explain this approach to each party at the 
commencement of mediation or in the first caucus session. 
 62. Vescovo et al., supra note 24, at 81.  
 63. See, e.g., Flake & Perrin, supra note 1; Vescovo et al., supra note 24; 
Williams, supra note 27. 
 64. Robert A. Creo, Emerging from No Man’s Land to Establish a Bargaining 
Model, 19 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 191, 206–07 (2001). 
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When the mediator and parties elect to negotiate under a 
blind or double blind format, they dramatically reduce the extent 
of information provided to each party regarding interim settlement 
positions.  The mediator typically publishes the claimant’s opening 
demand to all defending parties.  From that point forward, until 
either the case settles or the parties reach impasse, the mediator 
negotiates with confidential numbers from all parties.65  Under this 
approach, the mediator will not disclose a single party’s settlement 
offers or demands to any other party up to and through the final 
settlement or impasse.66 This process is discussed below in greater 
detail. 
In response to the opening demand, the mediator will speak to 
all defending parties to confirm the claimants’ opening demand 
and secure a contribution toward settlement from all defending 
parties.  The mediator will then add up the contributions of all the 
defendants and disclose the total of these contributions to the 
claimant as the collective offer.  The mediator will not disclose 
individual contributions from each defendant.  After the plaintiff 
considers the opening offer and responds with a new demand, the 
mediator will keep the new demand confidential.  Instead of 
disclosing the new demand, the mediator simply discloses to each 
defendant the gap between the claimant’s new demand and the 
defendants’ collective offer.  Then, the mediator again meets with 
each individual defendant to determine if additional contributions 
can be secured toward settlement. 
As the mediation progresses, the claimant will know the total 
amount offered by the defendants but will not know any individual 
contribution from a specific defendant.  Each defendant will know 
the total amount it agreed to contribute toward a settlement and 
the gap between the demand and the collective offers.  As the gap 
is reduced, each defendant can ultimately determine what 
contribution will be required on its behalf in order to reach a 
settlement point.  If a settlement is reached, the claimant will know 
the total amount offered and ultimately accepted to settle the case.  
The claimant will not know, however, how the amount was raised 
or any individual defendant’s contribution toward the settlement.  
Additionally, each individual defendant will not know the total 
settlement amount, but instead will know only its respective 
 65. See id. at 206. 
 66. Id. 
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contribution toward the settlement amount.  Blind negotiation 
prohibits any single party from knowing what the other parties 
contributed to the final settlement.  Further, no party other than 
the claimant will know what the claimant accepted as a final 
settlement amount. 
To illustrate how blind negotiation of multi-party cases works, 
consider the example of a typical construction defect claim.  
Assume that the claimant developed a large condominium project 
and brought suit against six defendants:  the design professional, 
the general contractor, a product manufacturer, and three 
subcontractors.  The claimant’s opening demand to settle the claim 
is $1 million.  That number is communicated to each of the six 
defendants.  In response, the mediator solicits responses from each 
of the defendants.  The defendants contribute a total of $300,000 
as their opening response to the demand.  The individual 
contributions are as follows: 67
 
Design professional                                     $100,000 
General Contractor                                     $100,000 
Product manufacturer                                  $25,000 
Subcontractor 1                                             $25,000 
Subcontractor 2                                             $25,000 
Subcontractor 3                                             $25,000 
 
Under the blind approach, when the mediator returns to 
speak with the claimant, the mediator conveys an offer of $300,000 
but does not detail individual contributions.  Assume the claimant 
rejects the offer but responds with a demand of $750,000.  Upon  
returning to the defendants, the mediator does not disclose the 
total amount offered to the plaintiff.  The mediator also does not 
disclose the total amount now demanded by the owner.  The 
mediator simply advises each defendant that the gap in settlement 
positions has been reduced to $450,000, and confirms with each 
defendant in confidence the amount of money used from that 
individual defendant to establish the current gap.  The mediator 
then discusses with each defendant the possibility of securing 
additional settlement authority, or other pertinent issues.  By 
disclosing the gap, the mediator confirms that the case will settle if 
 67. Stated contributions are hypothetical only and are not intended to reflect 
any allocation or history of payments in past mediations or the author’s opinion as 
to appropriate or proportionate contributions on any given case. 
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he can secure additional settlement contributions from the 
defendants and/or additional settlement concessions from the 
claimant totaling $450,000. 
To carry this hypothetical one step further, assume that in the 
second round of negotiations the defendants increase their 
individual contributions as follows: 
 
Design professional                                     $200,000 
General Contractor                                     $150,000 
Product manufacturer                                  $50,000 
Subcontractor 1                                             $50,000 
Subcontractor 2                                             $50,000 
Subcontractor 3                                             $50,000 
 
After completing the second round of negotiations, the 
mediator again reports to the claimant.  The mediator advises that 
he secured increased contributions totaling $550,000.  Again, 
individual contributions are not disclosed to the claimant.  In 
response, the claimant either accepts the money or makes another 
demand.  Assuming the claimant rejects the offer but agrees to 
settle for $650,000, the mediator again returns to the defendants 
and advises the defendants that the new gap in settlement positions 
is $100,000.  This process continues until either the case is settled, 
because the gap has been filled, or until the parties no longer move 
and reach impasse. 
Variations of the blind negotiation approach exist.  Some 
mediators have used a completely blind process among parties 
where the gap is not disclosed between the parties.68  Instead, the 
mediator may publish an opening position from the claimant and 
the opening position from the defendants.  The mediator then 
approaches each party in a serial and parallel manner to solicit 
their successive bids or moves.  The mediator only discloses 
whether another party is actively moving or that progress is being 
made toward settlement.69  When the parties are almost in 
agreement or at agreement, the mediator either discloses the gap 
and suggests final numbers to settle or discloses that the case 
actually settled.70
 68. Creo, supra note 64, at 207. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
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Another blind negotiation approach is referred to as the 
“safety deposit box” method.  Under this approach, the mediator 
asks each party to put his bottom line number into a safety deposit 
box.71  The mediator then advises that if the numbers overlap, the 
midpoint of the numbers shall be the settlement amount.  If any 
significant gap exists based upon these blind numbers, then the 
parties are told that a gap exists but are not told of the other side’s 
number or the size of the gap.72  The parties are then told that they 
may keep their number confidential, disclose their number, or 
agree to mutual disclosure.73  If the parties are close to agreement, 
the mediator identifies a number, which in his opinion would settle 
the case.  If a large gap exists, the numbers may be disclosed or the 
mediator may continue to work and disclose only the extent of the 
gap.74
Another variation of the blind approach is the “double blind” 
mediator’s proposal.75  Under this approach, the mediator 
proposes last and final numbers to all parties.76  The mediator then 
asks for only a “yes” or “no” response.  If all parties answer “yes,” 
the case is resolved.  If any party answers “no,” the case continues.  
A party answering “no” is not entitled to know the response of the 
parties.77
The blind methods of mediation are not appropriate for every 
case.  The mediator needs to determine whether the facts, law, and 
relative settlement positions of the parties indicate that blind 
negotiations would be productive.  At times, the mediation process 
benefits from open disclosure of all settlement positions, in which 
case blind negotiations are counterproductive.  Other times, 
however, full disclosure of early settlement positions would be 
counterproductive and reduce chances of successfully resolving the 
case.  Given the difficulty of settling multiparty construction cases, 
the mediator should at least consider the relative advantages and 
disadvantages of the blind method of negotiation.  In this regard, 
the mediator should determine whether the advantages of blind 
negotiation outweigh any potential detriments. 
 71. Peter Contuzzi, Should Parties Tell Mediators Their Bottom Line?, 6 No. 3 
DISP. RESOL. MAG. 30, 31–32 (2000). 
 72. Id. at 32. 
 73. Id. at 30–32. 
 74. Id. at 32. 
 75. Creo, supra note 64, at 206. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
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IV. ADVANTAGES TO BLIND NEGOTIATIONS 
A.    Advantages to Claimants 
Initially, from the claimant’s perspective, the use of blind 
negotiations offers certain advantages.  First, a claimant may make 
concessions to his true bottom line without worry that it will be 
published and, in the event of impasse, used as a starting point for 
future negotiations.  A claimant and his counsel are fully aware of 
this risk in open negotiations and are sometimes reluctant to 
disclose a true bottom line because they want to “save room” for 
future negotiations.  Blind negotiations allow a claimant to move to 
his lowest number without repercussion in the event of impasse.  
Blind negotiation gives a claimant substantial flexibility in the event 
that the case does not settle.  A claimant can stay with his stated 
bottom line, move to a higher number, or continue to make 
concessions and move to a lower number.  By providing a claimant 
with the protection to go to his true bottom line, the blind 
negotiation increases opportunities to settle the case during the 
mediation. 
Second, a claimant will have slightly more information than 
the other parties to the mediation.  A claimant will know the total 
amount offered to settle the case as well as the total demand.  
Although the claimant does not know the individual contributions 
that comprise the offer, he may have a better feel as to whether the 
case can settle and for potential settlement ranges.  Moreover, a 
claimant can adjust his demand to show progress or to close a gap 
as required to keep negotiations moving. 
The use of blind negotiations is particularly beneficial to a 
claimant in situations where the defendants generally agree on the 
total settlement value of the case but disagree on their relative 
contributions to reach that amount.  Under these circumstances, a 
defendant will often agree to pay a set percentage of the reasonable 
settlement value of the case.  For example, if a defendant 
determined a case had a settlement value of $700,000 and that he 
was responsible for half of the settlement, the defendant would 
have authority of $350,000.  If, in open negotiations, the claimant 
indicated it would accept $600,000, the danger exists that the 
defendant with authority of $350,000 would reduce its contribution 
toward settlement from $350,000 to $300,000 to reflect his view of 
the proper liability allocation.  Under the blind approach, the 
16
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claimant can reduce his demand in order to settle the case without 
fear that the defendants will reduce their relative contributions. 
B.    Advantages to Defendants 
Blind negotiations also offer advantages to defendants.  First, 
defendants can offer whatever amounts they deem appropriate to 
settle the case without fear that their highest offer at mediation will 
become the starting point for future negotiations.78  Second, 
defendants need not worry that their contributions in any single 
case will become public and, in effect, set a precedent for 
negotiations.  Often this confidentiality is equally important to the 
defendants, their insurers, and their lawyers.  Third, defendants 
negotiating in the blind do not need to worry that their 
contributions towards any given settlement will be viewed as 
disproportionate to the contributions of other parties.  Because the 
ultimate settlement amount and individual contributions remain 
confidential throughout the entire process, no party needs to worry 
about complaints regarding the proportionality of its contributions.  
Instead, the focus remains on each individual defendant and 
whether he believed his payment was fair in exchange for a release 
of claims from all other parties. 
C.    Advantages to Mediator 
Multiparty mediations of any sort can be difficult based solely 
on the number, extent, and complexity of disputed issues and 
parties.  The degree of difficulty increases when the negotiating 
styles of the participants or personalities create additional friction 
or hurdles to settlement.  One well-known author analyzed 
negotiating styles and categorized styles broadly as either 
“cooperative” or “competitive.”79  Common traits employed to 




 78. A related benefit also exists.  Where both the defendants and plaintiffs 
have the freedom to move to settlement positions without fear that the numbers 
or their positions will become public, defendants will benefit from this added 
flexibility. 
 79. CRAVER, supra note 25, § 2.02. 
 80. Id. § 2.02(1).  See also ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES, 
NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 9 (Bruce Patton ed., 1981). 
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Move Psychologically Against 
Opponents 
Try to Maximize Joint 
Return 
Try to Maximize Own Return 
Seek Reasonable Results Seek Extreme Results 
Courteous and Sincere Adversarial and Disingenuous 
Begin with Realistic 
Opening Positions 
Begin with Unrealistic 
Opening Positions 
Rely on Objective Standards Focus on Own Positions 
Rather Than Neutral 
Standards 





Open and Trusting Closed and Untrusting 
Work to Satisfy Underlying 
Interests of Opponents 
Work to Satisfy Underlying 
Interests of Own Client 
Willing to Make Unilateral 
Concessions 
Attempt to Make Minimal 
Concessions 
Reason with Opponents Manipulate Opponents 
 
Authors also have noted the distinction between principled 
and positional bargaining, hard and soft bargaining, and win-lose 
and win-win negotiations.81  By negotiating in the blind, the 
mediator has the opportunity to defuse some of the hard 
bargaining tactics typically used by “competitive/adversarial” 
negotiators.  Such negotiators’ attempts to manipulate opponents, 
use threats, commence unrealistic opening positions, or seek 
extreme results can all be mitigated, at least to some degree, 
through the use of blind negotiations.  For example, in the 
hypothetical case discussed earlier of the six defendants, if one 
defendant opens up with an unrealistically low number in open 
negotiations or indicates he would not contribute toward 
settlement, this often chills or adversely affects the negotiation 
 
 81. Id. at 56–57 (discussing the importance of creating options for “mutual 
gain”); RONALD M. SHAPIRO & MARK J. JENKOWSKI, THE POWER OF NICE: HOW TO 
NEGOTIATE SO EVERYONE WINS—ESPECIALLY YOU 27-61 (1998) (discussing the 
dangers of “I win – you lose” negotiations and emphasizing the benefits of “win-
win” negotiations). 
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process.  This defendant’s extreme position may lead the other 
defendants to take extreme positions in response.  By negotiating 
in the blind, one party’s extreme position will not necessarily infect 
the entire process. 
The second advantage to mediators is the ability to buy time to 
respond to unreasonable or extreme bargaining positions.  If one 
defendant starts unreasonably low but another defendant is willing 
to put in money early, the mediator can allow one party to 
essentially “over-contribute” early in the process to further the 
negotiation process.  As the parties get closer to resolution, a party 
that is too low may adjust its position and ultimately make a 
significant contribution while the other party that “over-
contributed” can reduce its proportionate share later in the 
process.  The use of confidential or blind negotiations allows the 
mediator to use early progress from certain defendants to increase 
chances that by the end of the mediation, he will be able to secure 
reasonable contributions from all parties. 
Blind negotiations also help mediators manage perceptions of 
the parties.  Mediators must acknowledge that individuals 
participating in bargaining are necessarily competitive.  Even in the 
classic “win-win” negotiation setting, each party would like his win 
to be slightly better than the others.82  Similarly, when participants 
use cooperative techniques to expand the overall benefits of 
settlement to all parties, some parties will simultaneously continue 
to employ competitive tactics that enable them to claim victory at 
the mediation.83  Where the parties do not know the final 
settlement number and do not know what the other parties paid, 
but do know that they accomplished a settlement within their 
stated goals, is it much easier to declare or claim victory in the 
negotiations.  Cases are less difficult to settle when all parties 
perceive they were victorious.  The blind negotiation approach 
increases this chance. 
Blind settlement negotiations also help limit the tactic referred 
to as “nibbling.”  Nibbling is the practice of negotiators who seek to 
negotiate to an apparent resolution based on a recommendation or 
apparent authority, and then later attempt to reopen negotiations 
when the agreement is documented.84  Under this technique, 
negotiators “agree” to final settlements with apparent client 
 82. SHAPIRO & JENKOWSKI, supra note 81, at 45–46. 
 83. CRAVER, supra note 25, § 9.02. 
 84. Id. § 10.02(10)(a). 
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authority.  All parties are then pleased with the agreement and 
develop a mindset that the case is settled.  Later, one party will 
indicate that he is unable to secure final authority and then seeks 
to negotiate additional concessions.85  Although the tactic seems 
obvious, it is quite frequently used and successfully employed.86  
Where the positions of all parties are confidential, the mediator 
can control each party and declare a settlement exists only when it 
in fact has final authority.  Further, because the final settlement 
terms are confidential, a party only knows its contribution and is 
unable to determine where it can most effectively “nibble” at the 
positions of other parties. 
The blind negotiation technique also helps the mediator focus 
parties on the particular case at issue as opposed to future cases.  In 
other words, defendants often times fight the request to contribute 
towards a settlement or to increase an offer in fear that the move 
will affect negotiations in future cases.  The same is true for 
claimants and claimants’ lawyers that express a reluctance to lower 
a demand.  The parties and their counsel may fear that concessions 
would be seen as a weakness that could affect other cases.  
However, when the ultimate settlement and each party’s 
contribution to the settlement remain confidential, no 
precedential value attaches to the result.  This greatly increases the 
chances that the parties will negotiate on the specific case at issue 
and not on unknown or unrelated cases that may occur in the 
future. 
Negotiating in the blind also helps avoid the parties present 
surprises with regard to the positions of co-defendants or co-
claimants.  These surprises are often in the form of demands or 
offers that frequently ruin mediation negotiations.87  For example, 
in open negotiation parties may say that they will move only 
conditioned upon proportionate moves from other parties.  Parties, 
however, rarely agree on the same proportionality.88  Another 
situation occurs when a defendant indicates he will not move again 
until the claimants have reduced their demand to what that 
defendant views as a realistic level.  When the negotiations are 
 85. Id. (citing MARTIN E. LATZ, GAIN THE EDGE: NEGOTIATING TO GET WHAT YOU 
WANT 207 (2004)). 
 86. GARY KARRASS, NEGOTIATE TO CLOSE 109–10 (1985). 
 87. See Robert A. Creo, How a ‘Blind-Trust Method’ Resolves Multi-Defendant 
Cases, 17 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 145 (1999) (discussing methods for 
handling defendants who have a great deal of mistrust among themselves). 
 88. Id. 
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blind, defendants do not know if claimants moved to a realistic 
level or if other defendants made contributions to a realistic level.  
Instead, defendants only know their current contribution and the 
gap that needs to be filled prior to settlement.  This helps the 
mediator keep each party focused only on his contribution and the 
relative merits or demerits of continuing settlement. 
V. DISADVANTAGES TO BLIND NEGOTIATIONS 
Disadvantages to blind negotiations exist.  First, a certain 
reluctance to proceed in the blind by all parties is present, 
particularly to those unfamiliar with the process.  Lawyers and 
parties want more information as opposed to less.89  Lawyers and 
their clients are constantly looking for a “leakage” of information 
from the mediator as to the positions taken by other parties or the 
facts provided by another party that will give them the upper hand 
in settlement negotiations. 
Second, the blind system of negotiation affects the pace of 
negotiations.  Typically, where parties know that their contributions 
are confidential, they may tend to start at a slightly lower level.  
Thus, negotiations begin slowly.  The opening gaps are typically 
large and intimidating.  Many times the opening gaps are larger 
than what might be the ultimate settlement value of the case.  
However, if the mediator is committed to proceeding under a blind 
approach, it is essential to keep the parties negotiating even when 
opening gaps are viewed as enormous.  In this regard, the mediator 
should understand that the negotiation dynamics vary under the 
blind approach as compared to the open approach.  Typically, the 
numbers will move up in roughly equal steps as the parties 
complete rounds of negotiation until parties near the end of their 
settlement authority or range.  The mediator must understand this 
phenomenon and explain it to all parties, particularly claimants, in 
order to keep them engaged early in the process when the gap 
seems insurmountable. 
Third, the mediator will be constantly subjected to questions 
regarding the relative positions of the parties.  If the process is truly 
blind, the mediator must guard each party’s position zealously.  
Besides disclosing the claimant’s opening demand or the fact that a 
party is contributing toward the settlement, the mediator should 
not provide information as to the amount of any particular party’s 
 89. Id. 
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contributions.  The leaking or disclosure of any single number 
could be enough to allow one party to deduce or identify the 
remaining numbers and thereby frustrate the process.  Further, if 
any party senses that the mediator did leak or will leak numbers, 
the chances of success will be reduced dramatically. 
VI. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN BLIND NEGOTIATIONS 
In blind negotiation, the mediator has important ethical 
responsibilities to the parties.  Initially, the mediator must remain 
impartial throughout the mediation.  In Minnesota, the General 
Rules of Practice for the District Courts confirm the obligation that 
the mediator must remain impartial.90  The UMA requires that 
before accepting a mediation assignment, the mediator shall 
reasonably investigate all circumstances to determine whether any 
known facts exist that a reasonable individual would consider likely 
to affect the impartiality of the mediator.91  The UMA provides that 
the mediator be impartial, unless the parties agree otherwise, after 
disclosure of required facts.92
The Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators also confirm 
the obligation of impartiality.93  Standard II provides that a 
mediator “shall conduct the mediation in an impartial manner and 
avoid conduct that gives the appearance of partiality.”94  It also 
requires that the mediator actually decline the mediation 
assignment if he cannot conduct the mediation in an impartial 
manner.95  Impartiality for these purposes is defined as “freedom 
from favoritism, bias or prejudice.”96
In blind negotiations, a mediator often offers estimates to each 
party of the settlement position required from that individual party 
in order to resolve the case.  In this regard, the mediator must not 
share information provided by a party in private caucuses regarding 
ultimate authority with any other party unless specifically 
 90. MINN. R. GEN. PRAC. 114 app. R. I. 
 91. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT (2003), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ 
archives/ulc/mediat/2003finaldraft.htm. 
 92. Id. 
 93. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (2005), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/documents/model_standards_conduct_april2007
.pdf.
 94. Id. at Standard II-B. 
 95. Id. at Standard II-A. 
 96. Id. 
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authorized to do so.97  Circumstances may exist where the mediator 
has been informed that a claimant’s bottom line is less than the 
total available authority of defendants.  Knowing the claimant 
would settle for less, the available authority raises the question of 
whether the mediator can intervene and advise the defendants not 
to offer much.  Conversely, the mediator may know that the 
defendants will offer more, and this raises the question of whether 
the mediator can advise the claimant to increase his demand.  The 
answer to both of these questions is not based on impartiality and 
confidentiality concerns.98  While the mediator may know a party’s 
bottom line, he is obligated not to disclose the bottom line unless 
he has specific permission.  Instead, the mediator is obligated to 
convey the stated authority as directed by each party.99
However, the mediator in this situation must be careful that, 
when conveying positions different from a previously disclosed 
bottom line, he does not advise other parties that an interim 
position is a bottom line.  This would be a misrepresentation and 
violate the mediator’s standards of conduct as set out in Rule 114, 
the UMA, and the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators.100
Several other ethical issues arise during blind mediations, such 
as whether a mediator should give an evaluation of the case, draft 
the written settlement agreement, or testify as to whether the 
parties actually reached an agreement.  Each issue arises in all 
mediations, but particularly in those where the blind method of 
negotiation is used.101  A full analysis of these ethical issues, 
however, is outside the scope of this article.102
 97. Id. at Standard V-B. 
 98. Vescovo et al., supra note 24, at 82. 
 99. Id.  See also Robert P. Burns, Some Ethical Issues Surrounding Mediation, 70 
FORDHAM L. REV. 691, 693 (2001). 
 100. MINN. R. GEN. PRAC. 114 app. R. IV; UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 8; MODEL 
STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS Standard V. 
 101. In blind negotiations, the Mediator needs to be prepared to draft the 
written agreement, or at least participate in drafting the written agreement to 
assure that provisions are made to maintain the “blind” status of negotiations, and 
to incorporate any mediation disclosures required by statute.  Minnesota Statutes 
section 572.31, subdivision 1, requires incorporation of certain language into any 
mediated settlement agreement as a condition to enforceability. 
 102. Those who are interested, however, see Vescovo et al., supra note 24, at 
81–85. 
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VII. DOCUMENTING A MEDIATED SETTLEMENT 
Negotiating the initial settlement agreement is certainly the 
key component to the success of any mediation.  Just as critical to 
the success of mediation, however, is the preparation of a 
thorough, complete, and enforceable mediated settlement 
agreement document.  This is particularly true in blind 
negotiations, where the mediator must structure the agreement 
and the payments in such a way as to maintain the confidentiality of 
the settlement amounts and contributions. 
The agreement must be reduced to writing.103  Historically, the 
mediated settlement agreement was a handwritten document that 
identified the key bullet points of the settlement.  The mediated 
settlement agreement was signed or initialed by all parties and 
subject to an agreement to prepare a formal settlement agreement 
and release.  More recently, in part due to the availability of 
technology, mediators prepare more detailed settlement 
agreements and releases for the parties’ immediate signature.  
Regardless of the final form, the agreement should be completed 
before the parties leave the mediation.  The documents are final 
binding expressions of the parties’ settlement and typically address 
the following: 
 
1. Consideration paid or accepted for the settlement; 
 
2. Timing for payment; 
 
3. Identity of payee and payer; 
 
4. Formal scope of any negotiated release of claims and 
confirmation of whether the releases are mutual or 
one-way; 
 
5. Issues of confidentiality, non-disparagement, or other 
peripheral terms of the agreement; 
 
6. Inclusion of mediation disclosures, such as stating  the 
mediator does not represent either party, the 
settlement agreement and release is binding and 
affects legal rights, and the parties have been 
 103. MINN. STAT. § 572.33 subdiv. 4 (2006). 
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represented by counsel and have authority to sign the 
agreement; and  
 
7. Inclusion of enforcement provisions.  Specifically, most 
mediated settlement agreements will include provisions 
indicating that all claims are released as set forth in the 
agreement but that all parties reserve claims relating to 
enforcement of the settlement agreement.  Typically, 
there will be an attorneys’ fees clause where the 
prevailing party is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees in 
the event it is necessary to enforce provisions of the 
settlement agreement.104 
 
The mediator, when preparing the mediated settlement 
agreement and release, should consider any unique state or 
jurisdictional requirements necessary to assure enforceability of the 
mediated settlement agreement.  In Minnesota, courts require 
specific mediation disclosures.105  In Haghgihi v. Russian-American 
Broadcasting Co., the Minnesota Supreme Court set aside the 
mediated settlement agreement because the agreement did not 
include required disclosures.106  The court noted that Minnesota 
Statutes section 572.31, subdivision 1, provides that a mediated 
settlement agreement is not binding unless it contains statutory 
provisions.107
 104. In construction cases, typically other issues exist that should be addressed 
in a Mediated Settlement Agreement.  Some issues that typically arise and that 
should be included by the mediator, regardless of whether the settlement 
negotiations are conducted openly or in the blind, are as follows: 
a. Handling of the retainage; 
b. Whether the release includes future, but as yet, undiscovered claims; 
c. Whether lien releases/satisfactions need to be prepared and exchanged; 
d. Whether closeout documentation is required between the parties; 
e. Addressing remaining work or punch list items; 
f.     Whether any subrogation or indemnity rights exist; and  
g. Indemnity or protection in the event of future claims for contribution or 
indemnity, warranties for any in-kind work, or other alternative 
consideration.  
Cf. Rodney A. Max, Multiparty Mediation, 23 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 269, 288–89 
(1999) (identifying some items to be included in the mediated settlement 
agreement).  The balance are items that should be considered based on the 
author’s experience. 
 105. See Haghgihi v. Russian-Am. Broad. Co., 577 N.W.2d 927 (Minn. 1998). 
 106. Id. at 929-30.  
 107. Id. at 928.  The 1996 statute stated: 
A mediated settlement agreement is not binding unless it contains a 
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In addition to these key components, in a blind negotiation, 
the agreement should include confidential attachments for each 
individual party confirming the amount each defendant 
contributed to settle the case or, in the case of claimants, the 
amount each agreed to accept in return for settlement of the case.  
The confidential attachment for each party is attached to the copy 
of the general mediated settlement agreement provided to that 
respective party.108  Usually each party initials the attachments, and 
the mediator retains the originals.109  The mediator should develop 
some typical language to implement the confidential mediated 
settlement agreement without disclosing the settlement amounts.  
The mediator can funnel the settlement contributions through his 
trust account to protect the blind status of the negotiations.110  The 
provision stating that it is binding and a provision stating substantially 
that the parties were advised in writing that (a) the mediator has no duty 
to protect their interests or provide them with information about their 
legal rights; (b) signing a mediated settlement agreement may adversely 
affect their legal rights; and (c) they should consult an attorney before 
signing a mediated settlement agreement if they are uncertain of their 
rights. 
MINN. STAT. § 572.35 subdiv. 1 (1996). 
 108. Language used by the author to implement the confidential settlement 
requires the use of attachments and reference to the attachments in the mediated 
settlement agreement.  A typical agreement could provide as follows: 
The Claimants agree to accept in full settlement of their claims and as 
consideration for the other terms and conditions of this Mediated 
Settlement Agreement the terms set out on the attached Confidential 
Exhibit A which shall be provided only to Claimants and their counsel 
and shall be held by the Mediator in accordance with the terms of this 
Mediated Settlement Agreement. 
 
Each of the Defending Parties agrees to pay or extend the consideration 
described in their respective Confidential Exhibits described below in 
exchange for a full release of the claims as set out in this Mediated 
Settlement Agreement, which Confidential Exhibits shall be separately 
provided to each Defending Party and its counsel and shall be held by 
the Mediator in accordance with the terms of  this Mediated Settlement 
Agreement. 
 109. The mediator needs to retain either the originals or a copy of the 
confidential attachments to monitor payments, and if necessary, take steps to 
confirm the parties have implemented terms of the confidential settlement 
agreement. 
 110. When mediating using blind negotiations, the settlement agreement must 
be structured to protect the confidential nature of each party’s contribution or the 
ultimate settlement amount.  This is done through the use of confidential 
attachments.  The following language has been used with blind negotiations to 
implement the settlement and establish a payment structure that maintains 
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confidentiality.  The structure calls for all payments to be made to the mediator’s 
trust account and then distributed by the mediator: 
CONSIDERATION. 
A. Consideration for the Claimants.  The Claimants agree to accept in full 
settlement of their claims and as consideration for the other terms and 
conditions of this Mediated Settlement Agreement the terms set out on 
the attached Exhibit A which shall be executed by the Claimants and 
shall be held by the Mediator in accordance with the terms of 
paragraph C below. 
B. Consideration Extended by Defending Parties.  Each of the Defending 
Parties agrees to pay or extend the consideration described in their 
respective exhibits described below in exchange for a full release of the 
claims asserted or that could have been asserted against and between 
the Claimants and Defending Parties in the above referenced matter as 
set forth above and in other terms and conditions of this Mediated 
Settlement Agreement, which exhibits shall be separately executed by 
each respective Defending Party and shall be held by the Mediator in 
accordance with the terms of paragraph C below. 
• Exhibit B – Consideration for Defendant 1 
• Exhibit C – Consideration for Defendant 2 
• Exhibit D – Consideration for Defendant 3 
• Exhibit E – Consideration for Defendant 4 
• Exhibit F – Consideration for Defendant 5 
• Exhibit G – Consideration for Defendant 6 
  All payments made shall be made within thirty days from the date of 
this Mediated Settlement Agreement, through checks payable to the 
Mediator’s trust account.  Mediator will disburse checks upon receipt 
of signed Mediated Settlement Agreement from Claimants and checks 
clearing trust account.  Defending Parties may evidence their 
acceptance of these terms by signature of this document, however in 
the absence of a signature, Defending Parties shall also be deemed to 
have accepted the terms of this Mediated Settlement Agreement by 
submitting payment of consideration reflected in this Agreement.  All 
Parties to this Agreement have advised Mediator that they accept the 
terms of this Agreement and signatures will follow. 
C. Confidentiality of Consideration.  All parties hereto acknowledge the 
sufficiency of the consideration for this Mediated Settlement 
Agreement, but further agree that such consideration shall be kept 
confidential in accordance with the following terms: 
(1) Exhibits A through G shall be separately executed by the 
respective party identified with said Exhibits. 
(2) Exhibits A through G shall be held by the Mediator and 
shall not be disclosed to any of the other parties unless and 
until the Mediator determines, in his sole discretion, that it 
is necessary to disclose the contents of one or more of said 
exhibits in order to effectuate and enforce the terms of this 
Mediated Settlement Agreement. 
(3) All Parties to this Mediated Settlement Agreement hereby 
agree that Mediator may release all checks provided within 
thirty days in one lump sum.  In the event checks are not 
provided within thirty days as required by this Mediated 
Settlement Agreement, then Mediator is hereby authorized 
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mediator should be aware that he could be characterized as an 
escrow agent with regard to the funds111 and must be careful only to 
release funds consistent with the terms agreed to by the parties. 
Although the time required to prepare a formal release can be 
extensive, the time is well spent because it helps avoid the 
negotiation of every term and interpretation of the handwritten 
settlement agreement.  Instances exist, however, when the use of a 
handwritten, bullet point, broad-form mediated settlement 
agreement is appropriate.  In those instances, the mediator should 
consider inserting a provision that confirms that the parties 
reached a binding and enforceable settlement agreement and that 
in the event of any final dispute over language, the mediator shall 
be the final arbitrator of the language.  In most situations, if the 
mediator has the ability to resolve any disputes regarding the final 
settlement language, the parties tend to be reasonable and the final 
agreement tends to be created without further mediator 
involvement.  Where, however, the parties are unable to agree 
upon final language, the mediator can resolve the dispute subject 
to his interpretation of the parties’ intentions.  By agreeing that the 
mediator can resolve disputes regarding final release language, the 
parties ensure a settlement and substantially reduce the potential 
of the settlement falling apart. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Unlike the construction project, construction mediation lacks 
plans and specifications.  The cliché that “mediation is more an art 
than a science” may be accurate.112  Every mediation takes its own 
course, and each mediator has his own style, which reflects his 
to advise Plaintiff of the identity of any parties that have not 
made payments, and Plaintiff may contact non-paying 
parties directly to secure payment. 
 111. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “escrow” as “[t]he general arrangement 
under which a legal document or property is delivered to a third person until the 
occurrence of a condition.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 584 (8th ed. 2004). 
Arguably, a mediator holding settlement funds for a third party pending receipt of 
a signed agreement fits this definition.  The author is aware that the Attorney’s 
Liability Assurance Society, Inc. (ALAS), a professional liability insurer for 
attorneys, has advised at least one firm that a mediator holding settlement funds 
could face liability as an escrow agent.  No cases have been located, however, to 
support or refute this position. 
 112. Stephen G. Bullock & Linda Rose Gallagher, Surveying the State of the 
Mediative Art: A Guide to Institutionalizing Mediation in Louisiana, 57 LA. L. REV. 885, 
942 (1997).  See also RYMAN, supra note 19, at 8, 9; Max, supra note 104, at 289. 
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personality.113  The mediator must take his individual style and use 
all the tools available to navigate parties toward the ultimate goal: a 
negotiated resolution.  Although construction mediations are 
complex, time consuming, and flush with legal, factual, and 
personal disputes, settlement potential exists.  Settlement provides 
closure, reestablishes and preserves relationships, and allows the 
parties to control their destiny.114  The use of blind negotiation can 
dramatically increase a mediator’s ability to successfully resolve 




 113. NADJA M. SPEGEL ET AL., NEGOTIATION: THEORY AND TECHNIQUE 20–21 
(Butterworths 1998). 
 114. FISHER & URY, supra note 80, at 23 (addressing negotiation strategies, 
styles, and results). 
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